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1 Introduction
Does raising the minimum wage provide incentives for rms to allocate resources to inno-
vation and the automation of the production process? Or does the decrease in low-skill
production labor as a result of raising the minimum wage lead to a reallocation of high-skill
labor from innovation and automation to the production of goods and services? We nd that
both scenarios are possible. Which scenario occurs crucially depends on a structural para-
meter that determines the elasticity of substitution between low-skill workers and high-skill
workers in production.
Specically, we consider a Schumpeterian growth model in which the production of goods
requires both low-skill workers and high-skill workers whereas the automation process and the
innovation process require only high-skill workers. Within this growth-theoretic framework,
we nd that raising the minimum wage decreases the employment of low-skill workers and
has ambiguous e¤ects on automation and innovation. Specically, the e¤ects of minimum
wage on automation and innovation depend on the elasticity of substitution between low-skill
workers and high-skill workers in production. If this elasticity of substitution is less (greater)
than unity, then raising the minimum wage leads to an increase (a decrease) in automation
and innovation.
The intuition of the above results can be explained as follows. Because the minimum
wage is binding in the low-skill labor market but not in the high-skill labor market, raising
the minimum wage reduces low-skill employment but does not a¤ect high-skill employment.
The decrease in low-skill production workers leads to a decrease (an increase) in high-skill
production workers if the two types of workers are gross complements (substitutes) in which
case the amount of high-skill workers for automation and innovation increases (decreases).
We also provide a quantitative analysis by simulating the quantitative e¤ects of minimum
wage on unemployment, capital intensity, automation, innovation, economic growth and
social welfare.
Finally, we test our theoretical results by estimating the elasticity of substitution between
low-skill workers and high-skill workers and the e¤ects of minimum wage on automation and
innovation in China. We nd that the elasticity of substitution between low-skill workers
and high-skill workers in China is greater than unity. In this case, our theory predicts that
increasing minimum wage has a negative e¤ect on automation and innovation. Using patent
data in China, we indeed nd that minimum wage has negative e¤ects on both invention
patents and automation patents.
This study relates to the literature on innovation and economic growth. The semi-
nal study by Romer (1990) develops the rst R&D-based growth model in which the cre-
ation of new products drives economic growth. Then, subsequent studies by Aghion and
Howitt (1992), Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Segerstrom et al. (1990) develop the
Schumpeterian growth model in which the quality improvement of products drives economic
growth. In this literature, some studies, such as Askenazy (2003), Meckl (2004), Agenor
and Lim (2018) and Chu, Kou and Wang (2020), introduce minimum wage into variants of
the R&D-based growth model to explore the relationship between unemployment and inno-
vation.1 This study di¤ers from these previous studies by introducing automation into the
1There are other approaches of incorporating unemployment into the R&D-based growth model; see
2
analysis and analyzing the relationship between minimum wage and automation. If we set
aside automation in the model, then our result relates to previous studies on minimum wage
and innovation by showing that the elasticity of substitution between low-skill workers and
high-skill workers in production determines the e¤ect of minimum wage on innovation.
This study also relates to the literature on automation and economic growth.2 The
seminal study in this literature is Zeira (1998), who develops a growth model with capital-
labor substitution. Subsequent studies by Zeira (2006), Peretto and Seater (2013), Aghion
et al. (2017), Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018) and Hemous and Olson (2018) introduce
this capital-labor substitution into variants of the R&D-based growth model to explore the
relationship between automation and innovation.3 This study complements these interesting
studies by introducing minimumwage into the Schumpeterian growth model with automation
in Chu, Cozzi, Furukawa and Liao (2019) to explore the relationship between unemployment
and automation. Prettner and Strulik (2019) develop a variety-expanding R&D-based growth
model with unemployment driven by fair wage as in Akerlof and Yellen (1990) to analyze the
e¤ect of automation on unemployment. Instead, we focus on the e¤ect of minimum wage on
the relationship between unemployment and automation, which turns out to be ambiguous
and depends on the elasticity of substitution between low-skill workers and high-skill workers
in production.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section
3 explores the e¤ects of minimum wage. Section 4 provides empirical evidence. Section 5
concludes.
2 A Schumpeterian growth model with automation and
minimum wage
The Schumpeterian growth model originates from Aghion and Howitt (1992). Chu, Cozzi,
Furukawa and Liao (2019) incorporate capital-labor substitution as in Zeira (1998) into
the Schumpeterian growth model with an automation-innovation cycle. We generalize their
production function to allow for a non-unitary elasticity of substitution between low-skill
workers and high-skill workers in production and introduce minimum wage into the model
to explore its e¤ects on unemployment, automation and innovation.
2.1 Household
The utility function of the representative household is given by
U =
Z
1
0
e t ln ctdt, (1)
Mortensen and Pissarides (1998) for search frictions, Parello (2010) for e¢ciency wage, Peretto (2011) for
wage bargaining, and Ji et al. (2016) and Chu et al. (2016, 2018) for trade unions.
2See Aghion et al. (2017) for a comprehensive discussion of this literature.
3See Chu, Cozzi, Furukawa and Liao (2019) for a discussion of these studies.
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where ct is the households consumption of nal good (numeraire) and the parameter  > 0
determines the rate of subjective discounting. The household maximizes (1) subject to the
following asset-accumulation equation:
_at + _kt = rtat + (Rt   )kt + wh;tH + wl;tlt + bt (L  lt)   t   ct. (2)
at is the value of assets owned by the household. rt is the real interest rate. kt is the amount
of physical capital owned by the household. Rt    is the rental price of capital net of
depreciation. The household has H + L members. Each of H members supplies one unit of
high-skill labor and earns the high-skill wage rate wh;t, which is above the minimum wage and
determined as an equilibrium outcome in the high-skill labor market. Each of L members
supplies one unit of low-skill labor. Employed low-skilled workers lt earn the low-skill wage
rate wl;t, which is determined by the minimum wage set by the government. Unemployed
low-skill workers L   lt receive an unemployment benet bt < wl;t. The household pays a
lump-sum tax  t to the government. Dynamic optimization yields the Euler equation as
_ct
ct
= rt   . (3)
Also, the no-arbitrage condition rt = Rt    holds.
2.2 Final good
Competitive rms produce nal good yt using the following Cobb-Douglas aggregator over
a unit continuum of di¤erentiated intermediate goods:
yt = exp
Z 1
0
ln xt(i)di

. (4)
xt(i) denotes intermediate good i 2 [0; 1]. Prot maximization yields the conditional demand
function for xt(i) as
xt(i) =
yt
pt(i)
, (5)
where pt(i) is the price of xt(i).
2.3 Unautomated intermediate goods
There is a unit continuum of industries i 2 [0; 1] that produce di¤erentiated intermediate
goods. If an industry is not automated, then the production process uses low-skill labor lt(i)
and high-skill labor hx;t(i). The production function is given by
xt(i) = z
nt(i)
n
(1  ) [lt(i)]
" 1
" +  [hx;t(i)]
" 1
"
o "
" 1
, (6)
where the parameter " 2 (0;1) is the elasticity of substitution between lt(i) and hx;t(i).
From cost minimization, the conditional demand functions for lt(i) and hx;t(i) are given by
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wl;t =
(1  )t(i)z
nt(i)
[lt(i)]
1
"
n
(1  ) [lt(i)]
" 1
" +  [hx;t(i)]
" 1
"
o 1
" 1
, (7)
wh;t =
t(i)z
nt(i)
[hx;t(i)]
1
"
n
(1  ) [lt(i)]
" 1
" +  [hx;t(i)]
" 1
"
o 1
" 1
, (8)
where t is the Lagrange multiplier from the cost minimization problem. Using (7) and
(8), we obtain lt(i)=hx;t (i) = f[= (1  )] (wl;t=wh;t)g
 ". We substitute this relative labor
demand function into (6) to derive
lt(i) =
xt(i)
znt(i)

wl;t
1  
1
 t

 "
, (9)
hx;t(i) =
xt(i)
znt(i)

wh;t

1
 t

 "
, (10)
where we have dened the following transformed variable:
 t 
"
(1  )

wl;t
1  
1 "
+ 

wh;t

1 "# 11 "
.
Using (9) and (10), we nd that the marginal cost of production for the leader in an
unautomated industry i is given by  t=z
nt(i). Aghion and Howitt (1992) and Grossman
and Helpman (1991) assume that the markup ratio is given by the quality step size, due to
limit pricing between current and previous quality leaders. Here we follow Howitt (1999)
and Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010) to assume that previous quality leaders exit the
market and need to pay a re-entry cost. In this case, the unconstrained prot-maximizing
monopolistic price would be innite, so we consider price regulation as in Evans et al. (2003)
to impose a policy constraint on the markup ratio such that
pt(i)  
 t
znt(i)
. (11)
To maximize prot, the industry leader chooses pt(i) =  t=z
nt(i). In this case, the wage
payment in an unautomated industry is
wl;tlt(i) + wh;thx;t(i) =
1

pt(i)xt(i) =
1

yt, (12)
and the amount of monopolistic prot in an unautomated industry is
lt(i) = pt(i)xt(i)  [wl;tlt(i) + wh;thx;t(i)] =
  1

yt. (13)
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2.4 Automated intermediate goods
If an industry is automated, then production uses capital as in Zeira (1998). The production
function is
xt(i) =
A
Zt
znt(i)kt(i), (14)
where A > 0 is a relative productivity parameter and Zt captures an erosion e¤ect of new
technologies that reduce the adaptability of existing physical capital. Given the produc-
tivity level znt(i), the marginal cost function of the leader in an automated industry i is
ZtRt=[Az
nt(i)]. Due to price regulation, the monopolistic price pt(i) is once again a markup
 over the marginal cost ZtRt=[Az
nt(i)] such that
pt(i) = 
ZtRt
Aznt(i)
. (15)
The capital rental payment in an automated industry is
Rtkt(i) =
1

pt(i)xt(i) =
1

yt, (16)
and the amount of monopolistic prot in an automated industry is
kt (i) = pt(i)xt(i) Rtkt(i) =
  1

yt. (17)
2.5 Automation-innovation cycle
This section derives the equilibrium condition that supports an automation-innovation cycle,
which can be explained as follows. When an industry becomes automated, it uses capital
as the factor input. In order for the automation to reduce the marginal cost of production,
we need the following condition to hold: ZtRt=A <  t. Then, when an automated industry
becomes unautomated, it uses the two types of workers as factor inputs. In order for the
innovation to reduce the marginal cost of production, we need the following condition to hold:
 t=z < ZtRt=A. Combining these two conditions yields  t=z < ZtRt=A <  t. In Lemma
1, we derive the steady-state equilibrium expression for this condition, in which gy  _yt=yt
denotes the steady-state growth rate of output.
Lemma 1 The steady-state equilibrium condition for the automation-innovation cycle is
1
z
<
h
A
(gy + + )
i 1
1 
< 1.
Proof. See Appendix A.
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2.6 Innovation and automation
Equations (13) and (17) imply lt(i) = 
l
t and 
k
t (i) = 
k
t . Therefore, we follow the standard
treatment to focus on the symmetric equilibrium in which vlt(i) = v
l
t and v
k
t (i) = v
k
t .
4 The
no-arbitrage condition that determines the value vlt of an unautomated invention is
rt =
lt + _v
l
t   (t + t)v
l
t
vlt
, (18)
which equates the interest rate to the rate of return on vlt given by the sum of prot 
l
t
and capital gain _vlt minus expected capital loss (t + t)v
l
t, where t is the arrival rate of
automation and t is the arrival rate of innovation. Similarly, the no-arbitrage condition
that determines the value vkt of an automation is
rt =
kt + _v
k
t   tv
k
t
vkt
, (19)
which equates the interest rate to the rate of return on vkt given by the sum of prot 
k
t and
capital gain _vkt minus expected capital loss tv
k
t , where t is the arrival rate of innovation.
The condition in Lemma 1 ensures that the previous automation becomes obsolete when the
next innovation arrives.
Competitive entrepreneurs perform innovation in industry i by employing high-skill labor
hr;t(i). The arrival rate of innovation in industry i is given by
t(i) = 'thr;t(i), (20)
where 't  'h
 1
r;t . The aggregate arrival rate of innovation is t = 'h

r;t, where hr;t denotes
aggregate R&D labor, and the parameter  2 (0; 1) captures the intratemporal duplica-
tion externality in Jones and Williams (2000).5 In a symmetric equilibrium, the free-entry
condition of R&D becomes
tv
l
t = wh;thr;t , 'v
l
t = wh;th
1 
r;t . (21)
Competitive entrepreneurs also perform automation in industry i by employing high-skill
labor ha;t(i). The arrival rate of automation in industry i is given by
t(i) = tha;t(i), (22)
where t  (1  t)h
 1
a;t and t is the endogenous share of automated industries at time t.
As in Chu, Cozzi, Furukawa and Liao (2019), the term 1   t in t captures an increasing
di¢culty e¤ect of automation under which more industries that are already automated make
the next automation more di¢cult.6 The aggregate arrival rate of automation is t = h

a;t,
where ha;t denotes aggregate automation labor and we have used the condition that ha;t(i) =
ha;t=(1  t). In a symmetric equilibrium, the free-entry condition of automation becomes
tv
k
t = wh;tha;t=(1  t), (1  t)v
k
t = wh;th
1 
a;t . (23)
4See Cozzi et al. (2007) for a microfoundation of the symmetric equilibrium in the Schumpeterian model.
5Davidson and Segerstrom (1998) show that constant returns to scale in multiple R&D actitivities can lead
to equilibrium instability and perverse comparative statics. Our model features innovation and automation,
so the decreasing returns to scale in innovation and automation helps to ensure equilibrium stability.
6Otherwise, ha;t(i) = ha;t=(1  t) would become unbounded as t ! 1.
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2.7 Government
We assume that the government sets the minimum wage as a certain percentage  of average
wage income, where  > 0 is the minimum-wage policy instrument. We will show that the
minimum wage wl;t is binding in the low-skill labor market if  is su¢ciently large. The
government collects a lump-sum tax  t to nance the unemployment benet subject to the
balanced-budget condition given by
 t = bt (L  lt) . (24)
2.8 Aggregation
Aggregate technology Zt is dened as
Zt  exp
Z 1
0
nt(i)di ln z

= exp
Z t
0
!d! ln z

. (25)
Di¤erentiating the log of Zt in (25) with respect to time yields the growth rate of technology
given by
gz;t 
_Zt
Zt
= t ln z. (26)
Substituting (6) and (14) into (4) yields the following aggregate production function:
ln yt =
Z t
0
ln

A
Zt
znt(i)kt (i)

di+
Z 1
t
ln

znt(i)
h
(1  ) [lt(i)]
" 1
" +  [hx;t(i)]
" 1
"
i "
" 1

di
=) yt =

Akt
t
t8><>:
Zt
h
(1  ) l
" 1
"
t + h
" 1
"
x;t
i "
" 1
1  t
9>=
>;
1 t
, (27)
where we have used kt(i) = kt=t, lt(i) = lt= (1  t) and hx;t(i) = hx;t= (1  t). The
share t of automated industries determines the degree of capital intensity in the aggregate
production function. The evolution of t is determined by
_t = t(1  t)  tt, (28)
where t = h

a;t and t = 'h

r;t are respectively the arrival rates of automation and innova-
tion. Using (2), one can derive the familiar law of motion for capital as follows:7
_kt = yt   ct   kt. (29)
From (9), (10) and (16), the capital and labor shares of income are respectively
Rtkt =
t

yt, (30)
7In Appendix B, we provide the detailed derivations.
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wl;tl =
(1  t) yt

(1  )"

wl;t
 t
1 "
, (31)
wh;thx;t =
(1  t) yt

"

wh;t
 t
1 "
. (32)
2.9 Decentralized equilibrium
The equilibrium is a time path of allocations fat; kt; ct; yt; xt(i); lt(i); kt(i); hx;t(i); hr;t(i); ha;t(i)g
and a time path of prices frt; Rt; wl;t; wh;t; pt(i); v
l
t(i); v
k
t (i)g such that the following conditions
hold in each instance:
 the household maximizes utility taking frt; Rt; wl;t; wh;tg as given;
 competitive nal-good rms produce yt to maximize prot taking pt(i) as given;
 each monopolistic intermediate-good rm i produces xt(i) and chooses flt(i); hx;t(i); kt(i); pt(i)g
to maximize prot taking fwl;t; wh;t; Rtg as given;
 competitive entrepreneurs choose fhr;t(i); ha;t(i)g to maximize expected prot taking
fwh;t; v
l
t(i); v
k
t (i)g as given;
 the market-clearing condition for nal good holds such that yt = ct + _kt + kt;
 the market-clearing condition for capital holds such that
R t
0
kt(i)di = kt;
 the market-clearing condition for high-skill labor holds such that
R 1
0
hr;t(i)di+
R 1
t
ha;t(i)di+R 1
t
hx;t(i)di = hr;t + ha;t + hx;t = H;
 the minimum wage in the low-skill labor market implies
R 1
t
lt(i)di = lt < L;
 the value of inventions is equal to the value of the households assets such that
R t
0
vkt (i)di+R 1
t
vlt(i)di = at; and
 the government balances the scal budget.
2.10 Steady-state equilibrium allocation
From (13) and (17), the amount of monopolistic prot in both automated and unautomated
industries is
lt = 
k
t =
  1

yt. (33)
The balanced-growth values of an innovation and an automation are respectively
vlt =
lt
+  + 
=
lt
+ ha + 'h

r
, (34)
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vkt =
kt
+ 
=
kt
+ 'hr
. (35)
Substituting (34) and (35) into the free-entry conditions in (21) and (23) yields
'h1 a
(1  )h1 r
=
+ ha + 'h

r
+ 'hr
,
which can be reexpressed as
'

+

ha
hr

=

hr
ha
1 
+

hr
ha
1 2

'+ =hr
. (36)
This equation shows that there is a positive relationship between ha and hr if   1=2; see
Figure 1 for an illustration.
We make use of (32) to obtain
wh;thx;t =
(1  t) yt

" (wh;t=wl;t)
1 "
(1  )" + " (wh;t=wl;t)
1 " . (37)
Based on (31) and (32), we can derive wh;t=wl;t = [= (1  )] (lt=hx;t)
1=". Substituting this
condition into (37) and using (23), (33) and (35), we obtain
 (  1) =
 (+ 'hr)h
1 
a
(1  ) l
" 1
" (H   ha   hr)
1
" +  (H   ha   hr)
, (38)
where we have used the market-clearing condition for high-skill labor hx + ha + hr = H.
Equation (38) shows that for any given amount of low-skill labor l, there is a negative
relationship between ha and hr.
Low-skill labor l in (38) is still an endogenous variable. To solve for l, we use the following
rule that sets the minimum wage as a percentage  of the labor share of output per capita:
wl;t = 
1  t

yt
H + L
, (39)
where (1  t)= is the labor income share. Substituting (5), (6) and t(i) = pt(i)= into (7)
and then the resulting expression into (39) yields
l = min
(
H + L

(1  ) l
" 1
"
(1  ) l
" 1
" +  (hx)
" 1
"
; L
)
. (40)
In summary, (36), (38), (40) and hx + ha + hr = H together solve for the steady-state
equilibrium allocation fhr; ha; hx; lg. We can substitute hx = H ha hr into (40) to obtain
the following implicit function:
l(hx) = l(H   ha   hr). (41)
Then, we substitute (41) into (38) to obtain
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 (  1) =
 (+ 'hr)h
1 
a
(1  ) [l(H   ha   hr)]
" 1
" (H   ha   hr)
1
" +  (H   ha   hr)
, (42)
which continues to feature a negative relationship between ha and hr as shown in the proof
of Lemma 2. Therefore, the equilibrium allocation fhr; hag is unique; see Figure 1 for an
illustration. Finally, we obtain fhx; lg using hx = H  ha   hr and (40).
Lemma 2 The steady-state equilibrium allocation fhr; ha; hx; lg is unique.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Figure 1
3 How minimum wage a¤ects R&D and automation
In the proof of Proposition 1, we show that if  is su¢ciently large, then the minimum
wage is binding in the low-skill labor market and causes unemployment such that l < L.
Intuitively, a binding minimum wage gives rise to an excess supply of low-skill workers and
causes their employment level to be below full employment. Then, any further increase in
the minimum-wage policy instrument  reduces the level of low-skill employment such that
dl
d
< 0. (43)
Intuitively, raising the minimum wage reduces the demand for low-skill workers l and their
employment level. Given that the employment of labor-skill labor is already below full em-
ployment (i.e., l < L), any increase in the minimumwage  would increase the unemployment
rate u that is given by
u(
+
) =
1
H + L
[L  l(
 
)]. (44)
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As for the e¤ects of the minimum wage on the allocation of high-skill workers, we need to
consider two cases for the elasticity of substitution between low-skill workers and high-skill
workers in production. If " > 1, then the right-hand side (RHS) of (38) is decreasing in l. In
this case, an increase in l must be accompanied by an increase in ha and hr and a decrease in
hx; see Figure 2 for an illustration. Conversely, if " < 1, then the RHS of (38) is increasing
in l. In this case, an increase in l must be accompanied by a decrease in ha and hr and an
increase in hx; see Figure 2 for an illustration. We summarize the above results as follows:
ha = ha (l) ; ha;l 
dha
dl
? 0 if " ? 1,
hr = hr (l) ; hr;l 
dhr
dl
? 0 if " ? 1,
hx = hx (l) ; hx;l 
dhx
dl
7 0 if " ? 1.
Figure 2
Therefore, if the elasticity of substitution between low-skill workers and high-skill workers
in production is less than unity (i.e., " < 1), then we obtain
dhx
dl|{z}
+
dl
d|{z}
 
< 0,
dha
dl|{z}
 
dl
d|{z}
 
> 0,
dhr
dl|{z}
 
dl
d|{z}
 
> 0. (45)
In other words, the decrease in low-skill production workers l (due to the higher minimum
wage) leads to a decrease in high-skill production workers hx given the gross complemen-
tarity between the two types of workers. As a result, the amount of high-skill workers for
automation ha and R&D hr increases.
If the elasticity of substitution between low-skill workers and high-skill workers in pro-
duction is greater than unity (i.e., " > 1), then we obtain
dhx
dl|{z}
 
dl
d|{z}
 
> 0,
dha
dl|{z}
+
dl
d|{z}
 
< 0,
dhr
dl|{z}
+
dl
d|{z}
 
< 0. (46)
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In this case, the opposite e¤ects prevail that the decrease in low-skill production workers l
(due to the higher minimum wage) leads to an increase in high-skill production workers hx
given the gross substitutability between the two types of workers. As a result, the amount
of high-skill workers for automation ha and R&D hr decreases.
Finally, we explore the e¤ects of minimum wage on economic growth. The steady-state
equilibrium growth rate of aggregate technology Zt is
gz() = () ln z = [hr()]
' ln z. (47)
Given that yt and kt grow at the same rate on the balanced growth path, the aggregate
production function in (27) implies that the steady-state equilibrium growth rate of output
yt is also
gy() = gz() = [hr()]
' ln z. (48)
Therefore, whether the equilibrium growth rate is increasing or decreasing in the minimum
wage also depends on the elasticity of substitution between low-skill workers and high-skill
workers in production. We summarize all the above results in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 An increase in the minimum wage has the following e¤ects: (a) a negative
e¤ect on the employment of low-skill workers; (b) a positive e¤ect on the unemployment rate;
(c) a negative e¤ect on high-skill production workers and a positive e¤ect on automation,
R&D and economic growth if the elasticity of substitution between low-skill workers and
high-skill workers in production is less than unity; and (d) a positive e¤ect on high-skill
production workers and a negative e¤ect on automation, R&D and economic growth if the
elasticity of substitution between low-skill workers and high-skill workers in production is
greater than unity.
Proof. See Appendix A.
3.1 Quantitative analysis
In this section, we provide a quantitative illustration by simulating the e¤ects of the minimum
wage on the macroeconomy. The model could feature scale e¤ects as in Aghion and Howitt
(1992). We sidestep this issue by normalizing high-skill labor H to unity. Then, the model
features the following structural parameters f"; ; ; ; ; ; z; '; ;A; Lg and a policy variable
. We assign their parameter values as follows.
We consider two values for the substitution elasticity " 2 f0:5; 2:5g that corresponds
to the range of empirical estimates reported in Katz and Autor (1999).8 Given that the
estimates in Katz and Autor (1999) are based on US data, we also consider US data when
constructing other moments for the calibration. We set the discount rate  to 0.05 and
the markup ratio  to 1.05. We follow Jones and Williams (2000) to set the intratemporal
duplication externality parameter  to 0.5. As for the capital depreciation rate , we calibrate
8The substitution elasticity " is more likely to be greater than unity according to recent estimates, see
for example Ben-Gad (2008) and Acemoglu and Autor (2011); however, " < 1 is still possible empirically.
13
its value using an investment-capital ratio of 0.0768 in the US. We set the distribution
parameter  between high-skill and low-skill workers to 0.634, which corresponds to a value
of 0.366 for the intensity of low-skill labor in Ben-Gad (2008). We calibrate the quality step
size z using a long-run technology growth rate of 0.0125 in the US. We calibrate the R&D
productivity parameter ' using an innovation arrival rate of one-third as in Acemoglu and
Akcigit (2012). We calibrate the automation productivity parameter  using a labor-income
share of 0.60 in the US. For the parameter A, we choose a value that satises the condition
for the automation-innovation cycle in Lemma 1. We calibrate the low-skill members L
using the unemployment rate of 0.06 in the US. Finally, we calibrate the value of  using
the skill premium wh;t=wl;t = 1:974 in 2008 in the US; see Acemoglu and Autor (2011). We
summarize the parameter values in Table 1.
Table 1: Calibration
"      z '  A L 
0.500 0.050 1.050 0.500 0.064 0.634 1.039 1.311 1.030 0.136 1.087 0.761
2.500 0.050 1.050 0.500 0.064 0.634 1.039 1.254 0.985 0.136 1.379 0.794
In the rest of this section, we simulate the e¤ects of the minimum wage  on the output
growth rate gy, the unemployment rate u, labor allocations fhr; ha; hx; lg, the share  of
automated industries and the steady-state level of social welfare U .9 Figure 3 simulates the
e¤ects of the minimum wage  when the elasticity of substitution between low-skill workers
and high-skill workers in production is 0.5 (i.e., " < 1). In this case, Figure 3a and 3b
show that raising the minimum wage  has a positive e¤ect on the growth rate of output
and the unemployment rate. The increase in the unemployment rate is due to the decrease
in low-skill production labor as shown in Figure 3f. As for the positive e¤ect on economic
growth, it is due to the positive e¤ect of  on innovation labor in Figure 3c, which in turn
is due to the negative e¤ect of  on high-skill production labor in Figure 3e. Figure 3d
shows that raising  also has a positive e¤ect on automation labor, which in turn leads to
the positive e¤ect on the share of automated industries in Figure 3g. Finally, Figure 3h
shows that raising the minimum wage  has a negative e¤ect on social welfare,10 which is
mainly driven by the decrease in the level of output as a result of the reduction in low-skill
production labor despite the increase in the growth rate.
9See Appendix C for the derivation of the steady-state level of social welfare.
10The welfare changes are expressed in the usual equivalent variation in consumption.
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Figure 3a: E¤ect of  on gy (" = 0:5) Figure 3b: E¤ect of  on u (" = 0:5)
Figure 3c: E¤ect of  on hr (" = 0:5) Figure 3d: E¤ect of  on ha (" = 0:5)
Figure 3e: E¤ect of  on hx (" = 0:5) Figure 3f: E¤ect of  on l (" = 0:5)
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Figure 3g: E¤ect of  on  (" = 0:5) Figure 3h: E¤ect of  on U (" = 0:5)
Figure 4 simulates the e¤ects of the minimum wage  when the elasticity of substitution
between low-skill workers and high-skill workers in production is 2.5 (i.e., " > 1). In this
case, Figure 4a and 4b show that raising the minimum wage  continues to have a positive
e¤ect on the unemployment rate but now a negative e¤ect on the growth rate of output. As
before, the increase in the unemployment rate is due to the decrease in low-skill production
labor as shown in Figure 4f. As for the negative e¤ect on economic growth, it is due to the
negative e¤ect of  on innovation labor in Figure 4c, which in turn is due to the now positive
e¤ect of  on high-skill production labor in Figure 4e. Figure 4d shows that raising  has a
negative e¤ect on automation labor, which in turn leads to the negative e¤ect on the share of
automated industries in Figure 4g. Finally, Figure 4h shows that raising the minimum wage
 continues to have a negative e¤ect on social welfare, which is now driven by the decrease
in the growth rate of output in addition to the decrease in the level of output (as a result of
the reduction in low-skill production labor).
Figure 4a: E¤ect of  on gy (" = 2:5) Figure 4b: E¤ect of  on u (" = 2:5)
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Figure 4c: E¤ect of  on hr (" = 2:5) Figure 4d: E¤ect of  on ha (" = 2:5)
Figure 4e: E¤ect of  on hx (" = 2:5) Figure 4f: E¤ect of  on l (" = 2:5)
Figure 4g: E¤ect of  on  (" = 2:5) Figure 4h: E¤ect of  on U (" = 2:5)
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4 Empirical evidence
In this section, we provide an empirical test of our theoretical results. Specically, we explore
the e¤ects of minimum wage on innovation and automation using Chinese rm-level patent
application data.11 We also use rm-level data from China Economic Census in 2004 to
estimate the elasticity of substitution between high-skill and low-skill workers. Following
Hendricks (2002), we dene workers with up to secondary education as low-skill workers and
workers with more than secondary education as high-skill workers. Given that we do not
have wage data by levels of education, we take the local minimum wage as a proxy for the
wage rate of low-skill workers. Then, we use the average wage rate of other workers as a
proxy for the wage rate of high-skill workers.
Combining (7) and (8), we derive the relative wage as a function of the relative employ-
ment of production workers. Then, we take log and adopt the following estimation equation
to estimate the elasticity of substitution as " =  1=1:
ln(wh=wl)i = 0 + 1 ln(h=l)i + i;
where (wh=wl)i and (h=l)i represent the relative wage and the relative employment between
high-skill and low-skill workers employed by rm i, respectively. Table D1 in Appendix D
provides the estimation results. In column 1, we directly regress relative wage on relative
labor. Then, we further control for industry xed e¤ects, ownership-type xed e¤ects and
city xed e¤ects from columns 2 to 4. The estimated elasticity of substitution given by
 1=1 is 1:80, which implies that low-skill and high-skill workers are gross substitutes.
12
We further estimate the elasticity of substitution in each sector, and the estimated values
of the elasticity are within the range of [1:60; 2:54]. This is consistent with estimates in the
literature; see for example Ben-Gad (2008) and Acemoglu and Autor (2011).13
Given that the elasticity of substitution between high-skill and low-skill workers is larger
than unity in China, our theory predicts that an increase in the minimum wage leads to neg-
ative e¤ect on innovation and automation. In order to test the impacts of minimum wage on
innovation and automation, we make use of three other databases in China: (1) annual rm-
level manufacturing survey data from the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC),
(2) rm-level patent application from China National Intellectual Property Administration
(CNIPA), and (3) city-level minimum wage and economic data. City-level minimum wages
are collected from local government websites, and city-level economic data come from China
City Statistical Yearbook (CCSY). We merge the rm-level data by rms name. We use
the total number of patent applications or the number of invention patent applications to
11Fan et al. (2018) provide an empirical study on the e¤ects of minimum wage on rm-level FDI in China;
see their paper for a discussion on the institutional background of minimum wages in China.
12Alternatively, we have used macro-level data from the CEIC Database to estimate the elasticity of
substitution in China. Following Acemoglu (2002), we add a time trend for the annual time-series data.
Wage and labor in high-tech sectors (other sectors) are used to proxy the wage rate and the number of
high-skill (low-skill) workers given that workers in high-tech sectors are largely more educated; see Ciccone
and Giovanni (2005). The estimated value of  1=
1
is 1:45.
13Few studies focus on the Chinese labor market, but several studies have shed light on other developing
countries, with the estimated values larger than one. For example, Psacharopoulos and Hinchli¤e (1972)
provide an estimated range from 2.1 to 2.5 for 9 developing coutries, Angrist (1995) nds a value of " = 2
for the Palestinian labor market, and Behar (2009) nds an elasticity of about 2 for 43 developing countries.
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proxy rm-level innovation and use the number of automation-related patent applications
to proxy rm-level automation invention.
We examine our story using the following empirical specication:
patentit = 0 + 1min_wagec;t 1 + 1Xi;t 1 + 2Zc;t 1 + 'i + 't + it.
patentit is the log value of the number of patent applications by rm i in year t.
14 min_wagec;t 1
is the log value of monthly minimum wage in city c in year t   1.15 Xi;t 1 is a vector of
rm-level control variables in year t  1, whereas Zc;t 1 is a vector of city-level control vari-
ables in year t  1. Firm-level control variables Xi;t 1 include the log of rm-level total asset
and the rm-level factor intensity measured by the capital-labor ratio. City-level control
variables Zc;t 1 include the log of GDP per capita and the log of population. 'i denotes rm
xed e¤ects, whereas 't denotes year xed e¤ects. The standard errors it are clustered at
city level. Our sample period is from 2000 to 2013, and we have 2,243,093 observations of
Chinese manufacturing rms after data cleaning. Table D2 and D3 in Appendix D provide
their summary statistics and description. 1 captures the e¤ects of minimum wage on rms
patent applications. According to our theoretical results, we should expect 1 < 0 given
that the elasticity of substitution is larger than unity in China.
Table 2: Minimum wage on innovation
All Patents Invention Patents
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Min_Wage -0.08715*** -0.10516*** -0.03260*** -0.04423***
(0.01971) (0.01964) (0.01125) (0.01113)
Firm-level Controls No Yes No Yes
City-level Controls No Yes No Yes
Firm Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2243093 2243093 2243093 2243093
Adj R-Squared 0.444 0.446 0.425 0.427
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors clus-
tered at the city level are reported in parentheses. All dependent variables
are logarithmic after adding 1. Firm-level controls include the log of as-
set and rm-level factor intensity (capital-labor ratio). City-level controls
include the log of per capita city GDP and the log of city population.
First, we examine the impact of minimum wage on innovation, using the total number of
patent applications at the rm level. As expected, columns (1) and (2) in Table 2 show that
minimumwage is negatively and signicantly associated with rms patent applications. This
implies that an increase in minimum wage decreases patent applications at the rm level.
Given that patents are classied into three categories,16 among which invention patents are
14Given that some rms have zero patent applications, we add one to the number of patent applications.
15If we use the minimum wage in year t, the results still hold.
16These three categories are invention, utility model, and design.
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most relevant for innovation, we further test our theory upon replacing the dependent variable
in columns (1) and (2) by the number of invention patents. In columns (3) and (4), we focus
on the number of invention patent applications. The signicantly negative coe¢cients of
min_wage in columns (3) and (4) support our theoretical result that an increase in minimum
wage has a negative e¤ect on innovation when the elasticity of substitution between low-skill
workers and high-skill workers is greater than unity.
Table 3: Minimum wage on automation
Automation Automation and Robot
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Min_Wage -0.00037** -0.00043** -0.00053* -0.00059**
(0.00017) (0.00017) (0.00031) (0.00028)
Firm-level Controls No Yes No Yes
City-level Controls No Yes No Yes
Firm Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2243093 2243093 2243093 2243093
Adj R-Squared 0.163 0.163 0.178 0.178
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors
clustered at the city level are reported in parentheses. All dependent
variables are logarithmic after adding 1. Firm-level controls include the
log of asset and the rm-level factor intensity (capital-labor ratio). City-
level controls include the log of per capita city GDP and the log of city
population.
We now examine the e¤ect of minimum wage on automation. Based on the application
description, a patent would be taken as automation-related if its application description
includes the word "automation". We could then measure the number of automation-related
patent applications at the rm level. The corresponding results are shown in columns (1) and
(2) of Table 3. In this case, the coe¢cients of min_wage remain negative and signicant.
To further test our story, we assume that a patent relates to automation if the application
description includes the words "automation" or "robot". The corresponding results are
reported in columns (3) and (4), in which the negative and signicant coe¢cients continue
to support our following theoretical result: when the elasticity of substitution between low-
skill workers and high-skill workers is greater than unity, an increase in the minimum wage
has a negative e¤ect on automation.17
17This decrease in automation invention does not mean that rms use less capital. Instead, we nd
that minimum wage has a positive and signicant e¤ect on the capital-output ratio of rms. Simulating our
model, we also nd that when the elasticity of substitution between low-skill and high-skill workers is greater
than unity, a higher minimum wage increases the capital-output ratio k=y = =[(gc + + )], in which the
negative e¤ect on gc dominates the negative e¤ect on . Results are available upon request.
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5 Conclusion
In this study, we have explored the e¤ects of minimum wage in a Schumpeterian growth
model with automation. We nd that raising the minimum wage has ambiguous e¤ects on
innovation and automation, which crucially depend on the elasticity of substitution between
low-skill workers and high-skill workers in the production process. In an economy in which
the two types of workers are gross substitutes (complements), raising the minimum wage
would have a negative (positive) e¤ect on innovation and automation. Therefore, the elas-
ticity of substitution between low-skill and high-skill workers is an important factor that
empirical studies should take into account when evaluating the e¤ects of minimum wage on
innovation and automation. We test our theoretical results by estimating the elasticity of
substitution between low-skill workers and high-skill workers and the e¤ects of minimum
wage on automation and innovation in China. We nd that the elasticity of substitution
between low-skill workers and high-skill workers in China is greater than unity and that
increasing minimum wage has negative e¤ects on both invention patents and automation-
related patents.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Using the no-arbitrage condition r = R    and the Euler equation
r = gy + , we can reexpress the equilibrium condition that supports a cycle of automation
and innovation as
1
z
<
Z
A

gy + + 
 

< 1. (A1)
We substitute (5), (6), (11) and (27) into (A1) to derive
1
z
<

1
A
 1
1 

y
k
 
1 
[ (gy + + )] < 1. (A2)
From capital income Rk = y=, the steady-state capital-output ratio is given by
k
y
=

R
=

 (r + )
=

 (gy + + )
. (A3)
Substituting (A3) into (A2) yields the steady-state equilibrium condition for the automation-
innovation cycle.
Proof of Lemma 2. From (36), it is easy to verify that there is a positive relationship
between ha and hr if   1=2. Moreover, we reexpress (41) as
l (hx) = l (H   ha   hr) , (A4)
where
lhx 
dl
dhx
=  
[ ("  1) ="] [(H   ha   hr) l]
 1
"
(1  ) l
 2
" + (=") (H   ha   hr)
" 1
" l
 (1+")
"
. (A5)
Equation (A5) shows that l is monotonically decreasing (increasing) in hx if " > 1(< 1). We
make use of (42) and (A5) to derive
dha
dhr
=  
h
(1  ) (H   ha   hr)
1
" l
" 1
" +  (H   ha   hr)
i
'h 1r + (+ 'h

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" 1
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 (H   ha   hr)
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(A6)
where
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" 1
" 
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1  ("  1)2

. (A8)
Equations (A7) and (A8) show  > 0 and   0 if "  2. Therefore, (42) features a
negative relationship between ha and hr if "  2. Based on (36) and (42), we obtain that
the equilibrium allocation fhr; hag is unique. From (A5), we know that l is monotonically
decreasing in hx or increasing in hx. Using this condition and hx = H   ha   hr, we obtain
that the equilibrium allocation fhx; lg is also unique.
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Proof of Proposition 1. We make use of (36), (38) and hx = H   ha   hr to derive
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It is helpful to note that we set   1=2 and "  2 so that the steady-state equilibrium
allocation fhr; ha; hx; lg is unique. Equations (A9) and (A10) show that both ha and hr are
increasing (decreasing) in l if " > 1(< 1). Given this result, it is easy to verify that there
is a negative (positive) relationship between hx and l if " > 1(< 1). Based on (40), we take
the di¤erentials of l with respect to  to obtain
dl
d
=  
h
(1  ) l
" 1
" + h
" 1
"
x
i2
(1  ) (H + L)
8<
:(1  ) l 2" + (=")h " 1"x l (1+")" [1 + ("  1) (l=hx)hx;l]| {z }

9=
;
. (A12)
We substitute (A11) into  and then use the su¢cient conditions of the unique equilibrium
(i.e.,   1=2 and "  2) to obtain
 =
h
(1  )h
1
"
x l
" 1
" +hx
i 'h 1r 
+ 'hr
+
(1  ) 

ha

+(+
)
(
+
1  
"

hx
l
 1 "
" 
1  ("  1)2
)
> 0.
As a result, (A12) shows that there is a negative relationship between l and . Given this
result, we make use of (44) to derive that there is a positive relationship between u and .
Combining (A12) and (A9)-(A11), we obtain that both ha and hr are decreasing (increasing)
in  if " > 1(" < 1) and hx is increasing (decreasing) in  if " > 1(" < 1). Finally, we use
(48) to obtain that g is decreasing (increasing) in  if " > 1(" < 1).
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Appendix B: The capital-accumulation equation
Using (2) and  t = bt (L  lt), we obtain
_at + _kt = rtat + (Rt   )kt + wl;tlt + wh;tH   ct. (B1)
Given at = tv
k
t +(1  t) v
l
t, we derive _at = t _v
k
t +v
k
t
_t+(1  t) _v
l
t v
l
t
_t. Substituting (28)
into this condition, we obtain
_at = t _v
k
t + v
k
t [t(1  t)  tt] + (1  t) _v
l
t   v
l
t [t(1  t)  tt] . (B2)
Substituting (B2) and at = tv
k
t + (1  t) v
l
t into (B1), we obtain
t _v
k
t + v
k
t [t(1  t)  tt] + (1  t) _v
l
t   v
l
t [t(1  t)  tt] +
_kt (B3)
= rt

tv
k
t + (1  t) v
l
t

+ (Rt   )kt + wl;tlt + wh;tH   ct.
Using (18) and (19) yields
_kt =  t (1  t) v
k
t + t
k
t + (1  t) 
l
t (B4)
 tv
l
t +Rtkt   kt + wl;tlt + wh;tH   ct.
Moreover, we make use of (13), (17), (30), (31) and (32) to derive
_kt = yt   ct   kt   t (1  t) v
k
t   tv
l
t + wh;tha;t + wh;thr;t. (B5)
Substituting (21) and (23) into (B5), we obtain
_kt = yt   ct   kt. (B6)
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Appendix C: The welfare function
The steady-state level of social welfare U can be expressed as
U = (ln c0) +
gy

. (C1)
The law of motion capital is _kt = yt   ct   kt. Using this condition, one can derive the
following steady-state consumption-output ratio:
c
y
= 1  (gy + )
k
y
. (C2)
Substituting (C2) into (C1) and using (27), the steady-state level of social welfare U can be
re-expressed as
U = ln

1  (gy + )
k
y

+ lnA+ ln

k


+(1  ) ln
8><
>:
h
(1  ) l
" 1
" + h
" 1
"
x
i "
" 1
1  
9>=
>;+ gy ,
(C3)
where Z0 is normalized to unity. The steady-state capital-output ratio and the capital-
technology ratio are respectively
k
y
=

R
=

 (r + )
=

 (gy + + )
, (C4)
k
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=
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" 1
" + h
" 1
"
x
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" 1
A (1  )

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
k
y
 1
1 
. (C5)
Substituting (C4) and (C5) into (C3), we obtain
U = ln

1  (gy + )
k
y

+


1  

ln

A

k
y

+ ln
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>:
h
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" 1
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h
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"
x
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" 1
1  
9>=
>;+ gy ,
(C6)
where we have used Z0 = 1.
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Appendix D: Data
Table D1 provides the estimated elasticity of substitution. Table D2 and Table D3 provide
the summary statistics and the data sources of the key variables in the main regressions in
Section 4.
Table D1: The estimated elasticity of substitution
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(h=l) -0.5530*** -0.5522*** -0.5531*** -0.5546***
(0.0057) (0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0049)
Industry Fixed E¤ects No Yes Yes Yes
Ownership-type Fixed E¤ects No No Yes Yes
City Fixed E¤ects No No No Yes
Observations 645122 645122 645122 645122
Adj R-Squared 0.648 0.650 0.651 0.710
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors clustered
at the city level are reported in parentheses.
Table D2: Summary statistics of the key variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables Observations Mean S.D. Min Max
Dependent Variables
All Patents 2243093 0.12826 0.51610 0 8.75684
Invention 2243093 0.05031 0.29129 0 8.66802
Automation and Robot 2243093 0.00032 0.01874 0 3.87120
Automation 2243093 0.00021 0.01434 0 3.04452
Control Variables
Asset 2243093 10.09361 1.43862 3.29584 20.16008
Capital/Labor 2243093 3.84738 1.36170 -7.42357 14.07496
GDP per capita 2243093 10.37613 0.91122 5.95783 13.01763
Population 2243093 6.24986 0.60353 2.77008 8.11474
Notes: All dependent variables are logarithmic after adding 1. All independent
variables and control variables are in year t  1.
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Table D3: Data sources of the key variables
(1) (2)
Variables Denition Data source
All Patents The log of patent applications CNIPA
Invention The log of invention patent applications CNIPA
Automation and Robot The log of utility-model patent applications CNIPA
Automation The log of design patent applications CNIPA
Min_Wage The log of monthly minimum wage at city level Local government websites
Capital/Labor The log of factor intensity (Capital/Labor) NBSC
GDPper capita The log of GDP per capita at city level CCSY
Population The log of population at city level CCSY
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